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I.

INTRODUCTION
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that
arbitration agreements in maritime transactions or contracts evidencing
transactions involving commerce are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.1
The text of the FAA, however, does not address the friction that arises
when the FAA applies to binding arbitration agreements that affect
federal statutory rights.2 As a result of this tension, courts developed the
effective vindication rule.3 Under this rule, courts inquire into whether
the arbitration provision at issue leaves a party unable to effectively
vindicate its federal statutory rights through arbitration.4 If so, courts will
not enforce the arbitration provision.
Because class actions are more integral for modern aggregate party
proceedings, since the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 23 (“FRCP 23”) in 1966, the FAA’s relationship with class
actions is becoming increasingly relevant.5 The FAA’s text is silent,
however, with regard to class actions.6 The Supreme Court’s 2013
decision in American Express Company v. Italian Colors Restaurant
(“Italian Colors”)7 illustrates the need for courts to revisit and clarify the
effective vindication rule to provide a more informative standard and
process for evaluating arbitration agreements that prohibit aggregate

1 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining “maritime transactions”).
Additionally, similar provisions are prevalent in state arbitration codes. William M. Howard,
Annotation, The Validity of Arbitration Clause Precluding Class Actions, 13 A.L.R. 6TH 145
(2014) (“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”).
2 9 U.S.C. § 2.
3 The effective vindication rule is a more fact specific, modern approach to the previously
applied doctrine of nonarbitrability, which rejected the use of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in causes of action under various federal laws including securities laws. See, e.g.,
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (“[W]e decide that the intention of Congress
concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid . . . an agreement for
arbitration of issues arising under the [Securities] Act.”), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
4 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
5 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
6 Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L.
REV. 767, 774 (2012).
7 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
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party proceedings.8 As a result of these pre-dispute arbitration
agreements becoming more prevalent in areas such as employment and
commercial contracts, there is a need for further guidance regarding
judicial evaluation of these agreements.9
The majority in Italian Colors failed to provide adequate guidance.
First, the majority did not consider the entirety of the contract at issue and
consequently blurred the meaning of the effective vindication rule.10
Second, because the majority did not address multiple ancillary
provisions in the contract, commercial entities are left without guidance
as to how courts will view them and whether courts will consistently
enforce them.11 Third, the majority mistakenly applied its own recent
precedent.12 Fourth, the majority mistakes the right to pursue claims with
the ability to pursue claims, which will often have the same practical
effect of parties foregoing a claim because it is prohibitively expensive.13
Through these errors, the possibility for abuse in adhesion contracts is
seemingly limitless, as a multitude of potential claimants may be left
without avenues to vindicate their rights, and commercial entities may
effectively insulate themselves from liability through creatively
constructed agreements.
Accordingly, the effective vindication rule must be revisited,
clarified, and codified in the FAA to specify that the rule applies
exclusively to the interaction between the FAA and federal statutory
rights and that the totality of the parties’ contract requires consideration
when evaluating whether an arbitration agreement leaves claimants with
no possible avenue to vindicate their rights. This entails: (1) providing
that all potential costs associated with pursuing a claim may be
considered; (2) emphasizing the cost-shifting nature and the ability of an
aggrieved party to spread costs under the agreement; (3) prohibiting
8

Id.
See Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and
the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 458 (2011)
(discussing data showing that businesses entities are increasing their use of arbitration
agreements in both consumer and employment settings).
10 See infra Part III.A.
11 See infra Part III.B.
12 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2304. Specifically, the majority mistook the principles
developed in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). Concepcion is
discussed in Part II.D.
13 See Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Our decision [in
Green Tree] made clear that a provision raising a plaintiff's costs could foreclose
consideration of federal claims, and so run afoul of the effective-vindication rule.”).
9
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baldly exculpatory clauses and prohibitive fees; and (4) providing that an
avenue for effective vindication is foreclosed when the provisions
function to make pursuit of the claim reasonably certain to be either
financially imprudent or expressly barred.14
Part II provides an overview of several developments and influential
cases addressing and giving rise to the application of the effective
vindication rule. Part III explains in further detail the reasons that the
effective vindication rule must be revisited, clarified, and codified. Part
IV concludes by suggesting a way in which the standard for the effective
vindication rule should be codified in the text of the FAA.
II. BACKGROUND OVERVIEW
A. Statutory Background
Congress enacted the FAA in an effort to combat judicial hostility
to arbitration.15 The regulatory framework for arbitration in the United
States is set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.16 The FAA
provides, in part:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.17

The first part of this rule represents the motive behind the enactment
of the FAA—arbitration agreements are a matter of contract and a
demonstration of the movement towards favoring freedom of contract in
this realm.18 Although the FAA’s text provides that valid arbitration
14 Even the majority in Italian Colors would refuse to enforce a baldly exculpatory clause
that “forbid[s] the assertion of certain statutory rights.” Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2310.
15 Id. at 2308–09 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745
(2011)).
16 Weston, supra note 6, at 771 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)).
17 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
18 See, e.g., Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (“[The FAA] reflects the overarching
principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.
Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (stating that terms of arbitration agreements must be adhered to even
when alleged violation of a federal statute is at issue, unless the FAA was “overridden by a
contrary congressional command”); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
281 (1995) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2) (“States may regulate contracts, including arbitration
clauses, under general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause
‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’”); Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (explaining that courts must
“rigorously enforce” arbitration agreements pursuant to their terms); Weston, supra note 6, at
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agreements ought to be enforced, it is silent with regard to a party’s right
to proceed in aggregate form.19 Because aggregate party proceedings,
particularly in the realm of class arbitration, are becoming increasingly
common, this issue is becoming increasingly relevant.20
For decades, courts rescued federal statutory rights from the FAA.21
Courts took the approach known as the nonarbitrability doctrine, which
was premised on the reasoning that Congress intended that such claims
should not be addressed through arbitration that “cannot provide an
adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding.”22 However, as arbitration
became more prevalent, this rigid approach was tested.23 The Supreme
Court eventually disposed of the doctrine of nonarbitrability in favor of
the effective vindication rule.24
The familiar contract law concept of unconscionability also plays a
major role in binding arbitration provisions.25 Consequently, a party
could challenge an arbitration provision through the effective vindication
rule or the unconscionability defense.26 On the surface, such an approach
makes intuitive sense because both doctrines are very similar and
typically apply to one-sided arbitration provisions.27 Specifically, the two
approaches overlap because substantive unconscionability evaluates the
fairness of a contractual provision.28 Therefore, if a party successfully
772 (explaining that freedom of contract is a fundamental purpose of the FAA).
19 See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
20 Cole, supra note 9, at 499–505.
21 See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (“[W]e decide that the intention of
Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid . . . an
agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the [Securities] Act.”), overruled by
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
22 Byrd, 470 U.S. at 223. For a brief historical overview of the development of the
nonarbitrability doctrine and a related doctrine, the separability doctrine, see Peter B.
Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 552–54 (2008).
23 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (“[W]e have
recognized that federal statutory claims can be appropriately resolved through arbitration . . .
.”).
24 See id. at 90.
25 See, e.g., Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 560 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009) (“As we
have repeatedly recognized, unconscionability is a generally applicable contract defense that
may render an agreement to arbitrate unenforceable.”).
26 See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 63 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining how both
the effective vindication rule and the unconscionability defense can be applied to claims
challenging one-sided arbitration provisions).
27 Id. at 63 (“As a practical matter, there are striking similarities between the vindication
of statutory rights analysis and the unconscionability analysis.”).
28 See A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122–23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
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demonstrates that a contractual provision denied it of its federal statutory
rights, courts could deem that provision either unconscionable due to
unfairness, invalid pursuant to the effective vindication rule, or both.29
Although the effective vindication rule has taken the place of the
stricter doctrine of nonarbitrability, the concern remains the same
wherein parties do not find themselves precluded from pursuing federal
statutory rights as a result of adhesion contracts.30
B. Mitsubishi Motors and the Emergence of the Effective
Vindication Rule
The emergence of the effective vindication rule is illustrated in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
(“Mitsubishi”).31 The case arose after an automobile manufacturer
brought suit against an automobile dealer for failing to pay for 966
ordered vehicles and various other breaches of the sales procedure
agreement.32 The dealer counterclaimed for multiple statutory violations
regarding unfair competition, including alleged violations of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.33
In concluding that claims under federal statutes, including the
Sherman Antitrust Act, are generally subject to arbitration pursuant to a
pre-dispute agreement, the Supreme Court warned that such claims might
not always be properly sent to arbitration according to the pre-dispute
agreements.34 The Court emphasized the purpose of the FAA by
explaining that courts must “shake off the old judicial hostility to
In A&M Produce, the court discussed California’s substantive unconscionability
jurisprudence and explained that substantive unconscionability concerns the actual content of
the contract at issue and a court may deem a contract unconscionable “if it reallocates the
risks of the bargain in an objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner.” Id. For further
discussion on unconscionability, see Craig Horowitz, Reviving the Law of Substantive
Unconscionability: Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to
Excessively Priced Consumer Credit Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REV. 940, 946–51 (1986).
29 See Kristian, 446 F.3d at 63–64 (finding several arbitration provisions prevented the
vindication of plaintiffs’ federal statutory rights and discussing the two methods of analysis).
30 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
n.19 (1985) (noting that when “choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem
as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations,
[the court] would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public
policy”).
31 See generally id.
32 Id. at 616, 619–20.
33 Id. at 619–20.
34 Id. at 627. The Sherman Antitrust Act is found at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
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arbitration,” but cautioned that this did not mean that parties are left
without recourse for their statutory claims; rather, they are properly
arbitrated as long as such claims can be adequately addressed.35
The Court, by explaining that an arbitration agreement will be
enforced “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,” introduced the foundation
of the effective vindication rule as a mechanism to ensure that statutory
rights are not foreclosed through an arbitration agreement.36 Furthermore,
the Court opined that if an arbitration agreement effectively foreclosed “a
party’s right to pursue statutory remedies,” it would be invalidated.37 The
Court then explained several common contract defenses to enforcing an
arbitration agreement and concluded that the agreement ought to be set
aside if the proceedings “in the contractual forum will be so gravely
difficult and inconvenient that [the resisting party] will for all practical
purposes be deprived of his day in court.”38 The effective vindication
rule, however, will only be applied in extreme circumstances when the
agreement forecloses—as opposed to merely lessens or complicates—a
party’s ability to pursue a federal statutory claim.39
The Court explained that arbitration, in general, could serve as a
legitimate substitute for judicial proceedings.40 Although the Court
demonstrated a trend towards accepting arbitration, it did not give
organizations a license to override federal statutory rights through their
35 Id. at 638 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978,
985 (2d Cir. 1942)). Specifically, the court explained that “a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum.” Id. at 628.
36 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 637.
37 Id. at 637 n.19 (“[I]n the event . . . clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver
of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little
hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.”) (internal citations
omitted).
38 Id. at 632–33 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972))
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39 Id. at 637 n.19.
40 Id. at 628 (“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”). The Court also
noted the potential role of arbitration in international transactions. Id. at 629 (citing Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)) (“[W]e conclude that concerns of international
comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the
need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes
require that we enforce the parties’ agreement . . . .”).
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arbitration contracts.41 The Court effectively reeled in the rigid
nonarbitrability doctrine and replaced it with a more case-by-case,
flexible approach to invalidate arbitration provisions as needed.42
C. Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph: Clarifying the
Burden of Proof for Invoking the Effective Vindication Rule
The Supreme Court directly addressed the effective vindication rule
in Green Tree.43 Randolph, the plaintiffs, purchased a mobile home with
the aid of financing through Green Tree.44 Green Tree’s contract with
Randolph required that Randolph purchase Vendor’s Single Interest
insurance and mandated arbitration of all disputes arising out of the
contract.45 Although the loan contract between the two parties mandated
arbitration, the agreement was silent as to arbitration costs and fees.46
Randolph subsequently filed a class action against Green Tree
pursuant to both the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., for
failing to disclose the required insurance purchase as a finance charge,
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f, for
mandating that Randolph arbitrate her statutory causes of action.47
Pursuant to the contract, Green Tree sought to compel arbitration, but
Randolph argued that she did not possess the requisite finances to proceed
in arbitration.48 Specifically, Randolph alleged that “arbitration filing fees
for claims below $10,000 were generally $500 and that the average
arbitrator’s fee per day is $700.”49 The District Court ordered arbitration
pursuant to the contract, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, and the Supreme
Court ultimately reversed the Circuit Court’s ruling.50
41 David Horton, Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of Rights
Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723, 734 (2012) (“Thus, although the Court paved the way for
the arbitration of federal statutory claims, it declined to give companies carte blanche to
rewrite the public laws through one-sided arbitration clauses.”).
42 Mitsubishi Motors Corp.,, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19 (explaining that if an arbitration
contract operated “as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies . . .
we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy”).
43 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
44 Id. at 82.
45 Id. at 82–83. Vendor's Single Interest insurance “protects the vendor or lienholder
against the costs of repossession in the event of default.” Id. at 82.
46 Id. at 82–83.
47 Id. at 83.
48 Green Tree Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. at 90 n.6.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 83–84.
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The Supreme Court’s reasoning hinged on the speculative nature of
these allegedly prohibitive costs.51 Although the Court did not challenge
the premise that high costs associated with an arbitration contract could
provide the basis for invalidating the contract, the Court ultimately
considered Randolph’s allegation regarding her prospective costs as too
speculative to warrant invocation of the effective vindication rule.52
In reaching this conclusion, the Court clarified that the party arguing
that the arbitration agreement as written is prohibitively expensive “bears
the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.”53 However,
the Court declined to precisely address the threshold level of that burden
of proof, as the plaintiff in Green Tree presented only “speculative”
costs.54 Additionally, nothing in the Court’s opinion indicates that such
fees were in any way unique and therefore, the Court left open the
possibility for various other costs to form the basis for finding a process
prohibitively expensive.55 Although dicta, if the Court had addressed this
issue, the Court may have provided future guidance for similar issues and
may have been influential in the Italian Colors decision.56 Specifically,
the Green Tree Court could have provided guidance for how courts
51 Id. at 91 (“The ‘risk’ that Randolph will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too
speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.”).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 92 (“Similarly, we believe that where, as here, a party seeks to invalidate an
arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that
party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs. Randolph did not
meet that burden.”).
54 Green Tree Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. at 92 (“How detailed the showing of prohibitive
expense must be before the party seeking arbitration must come forward with contrary
evidence is a matter we need not discuss; for in this case neither during discovery nor when
the case was presented on the merits was there any timely showing at all on the point.”).
55 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2318 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that “Randolph gave no hint of distinguishing among the different
ways an arbitration agreement can make a claim too costly to bring” and that “[i]ts rationale
applies whenever an agreement makes the vindication of federal claims impossibly
expensive—whether by imposing fees or proscribing cost-sharing or adopting some other
device”).
56 See id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Our decision there made clear that a provision raising
a plaintiff's costs could foreclose consideration of federal claims, and so run afoul of the
effective-vindication rule. The expense at issue in Randolph came from a filing fee combined
with a per-diem payment for the arbitrator. But nothing about those particular costs is
distinctive; and indeed, a rule confined to them would be weirdly idiosyncratic. Not
surprisingly, then, Randolph gave no hint of distinguishing among the different ways an
arbitration agreement can make a claim too costly to bring. Its rationale applies whenever an
agreement makes the vindication of federal claims impossibly expensive—whether by
imposing fees or proscribing cost-sharing or adopting some other device.”).
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should “distinguish [] among the different ways an arbitration agreement
can make a claim too costly to bring.”57 Nonetheless, Randolph set forth
the principle that the party seeking to set aside the agreement must present
sufficiently certain evidence of such an effective prohibition.58 Such a
requirement should reduce the risk of frivolous claims and prevent
increased costs for those entities seeking to avoid costly litigation through
these agreements.
D. Waxing and Waning of Class Action Waivers from Discover
Bank v. Superior Court to AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.
In the years preceding Italian Colors, the Supreme Court halted a
trend, largely spearheaded by California courts, disfavoring arbitration
agreements containing class action waivers.59 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court’s stance on the effective vindication rule remained murky before
Italian Colors because the Supreme Court did not directly rely upon the
effective vindication rule as applied to class action waivers with
prohibitively expensive prospective costs.60
In Discover Bank v. Superior Court,61 the California Supreme Court
invalidated an arbitration agreement’s class action waiver for
unconscionability.62 Specifically, this reasoning applied to claims of low
value because such claims were only prudently pursued on a class action

57

Id.
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. at 91 (explaining that to invalidate arbitration
agreements based on the speculative risk of alleged costs “would undermine the ‘liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements’”) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
59 Compare Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) (invalidating a
class action waiver provision in an arbitration agreement which made low value claims
imprudent to pursue), with AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)
(holding that the FAA preempted the state case law rule derived from Discover Bank and
compelling arbitration), and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l. Corp., 559 U.S. 662
(2010) (holding that class wide arbitration was improper when the agreement at issue provided
no guidance concerning the availability of class proceedings).
60 The contract in Stolt-Nielsen did not provide for either the allowance or preclusion of
class arbitration. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684–85 (explaining there was no contractual basis
for the party to submit to class arbitration). Concepcion was decided on the basis of
preemption; specifically, that the rule derived from Discover Bank conflicted with the FAA.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (“States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with
the FAA.”).
61 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
62 Id. at 1110.
58
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basis, if at all.63 After Discover Bank, several other jurisdictions followed
California’s lead in this field of class action waivers applying to low value
claims.64
However, the Supreme Court halted this trend in Stolt-Nielsen S.A.
v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. and AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion.65 In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court held that class arbitration was
not appropriate when the arbitration provision at issue was “silent” with
regard to the availability of class arbitration.66 The Court was wary of
presuming mutual consent to class wide arbitration absent an explicit
allowance for it.67 Then, in Concepcion, the Court held that the FAA
preempted the rule derived from Discover Bank.68 Specifically, the rule
derived from Discover Bank was deemed to be preempted by the FAA on
the basis of implied conflict preemption, as the rule could potentially slow
proceedings and the resolution of challenges.69
In Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted
California’s rule invalidating class action waivers as unconscionable.70
Because the holding was premised on preemption, the effective
vindication rule was inapplicable and therefore not addressed.71 As a
63

Id. at 1107–08.
See, e.g., Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 978–79 n.1 (9th
Cir. 2007) (citing ten California cases which also held various class arbitration waivers
unconscionable).
65 See generally Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740; Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. 662.
66 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 684 (“[A] party may not be compelled under the FAA
to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party
agreed to do so.”).
67 Id. at 685–86 (“[T]he relative benefits of class-action arbitration are much less assured,
giving reason to doubt the parties’ mutual consent to resolve disputes through class-wide
arbitration.”).
68 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (“[C]lass arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover
Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.”).
69 For a brief explanation of implied obstacle preemption, see infra note 160. The
Concepcion Court explained that this could make “the process slower, more costly, and more
likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.” Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751.
This was deemed to “interfere[] with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus create[] a
scheme inconsistent with the FAA.” Id. at 1748.
70 See Weston, supra note 6, at 769 (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740) (“Concepcion
Court stated that California's judicial rule invalidating class action waivers as unconscionable
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress [in the FAA].’ Therefore, according to the Court, the FAA preempted the
California law.”). The rule that was preempted was derived from Discover Bank v. Superior
Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
71 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2319–20 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“And just as this case is not about class actions, [Concepcion] was not—and could
64
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result, the decision did little more than state an accepted rule that federal
law preempts contrary state law under the Supremacy Clause.72
Consequently, Concepcion provides little guidance as to the
effective vindication rule’s role between the FAA and federal statutory
claims. Notably, Justice Antonin Scalia explained that even if class
actions might be necessary for smaller claims, which entail a higher cost
than the recovery is worth, a state cannot enact legislation contrary to the
FAA.73 The Court did not attempt to apply the effective vindication rule
because this was a matter of state law preempted by the FAA, so the
effective vindication rule, which applies when the claims are federal in
nature, was inapplicable.74
Justice Scalia explained the importance of the cost-shifting
provisions that were available to induce litigation in the contract at issue.75
The Court directly addressed the argument that aggregate proceedings
were necessary to preserve the availability to pursue claims of low value.76
Although the Court explained that proceedings pursuant to the costshifting mechanisms of the arbitration contract would be preferable to
class action proceedings, it is important to note that the Court ultimately
decided this issue on the fundamental doctrine of preemption.77
not have been—about the effective-vindication rule. Here is a tip-off: [Concepcion] nowhere
cited our effective-vindication precedents.”); see also Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
72 Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“And if that is not enough, [Concepcion] involved
a state law, and therefore could not possibly implicate the effective-vindication rule. When a
state rule allegedly conflicts with the FAA, we apply standard preemption principles, asking
whether the state law frustrates the FAA’s purposes and objectives.”).
73 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (“States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent
with the FAA.”).
74 In American Express, Justice Kagan explained that Concepcion “could not possibly
implicate” the effective vindication rule because it involved a state law that was preempted
by the FAA and rendered invalid through the Supremacy Clause. Am. Express Co., 133 S.
Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan further emphasized the distinction by
explaining that the effective vindication rule is only applicable when it is alleged that the FAA
conflicts with another federal law. Id. (emphasis added).
75 See id. at 2320 (discussing the benefits of the contract’s cost-shifting provisions).
Specifically, Justice Kagan emphasized that the complaint in Concepcion “was ‘most unlikely
to go unresolved’ because AT&T's agreement contained a host of features ensuring that
‘aggrieved customers who filed claims would be essentially guaranteed to be made whole.’”
Id. (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753).
76 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (rejecting the dissent’s argument that “class
proceedings are necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through
the legal system”).
77 Id. (“But States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it
is desirable for unrelated reasons.”). For cost-sharing, see id. (“[T]he arbitration agreement
provides that AT&T will pay claimants a minimum of $7,500 and twice their attorney’s fees
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At first glance, Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion appear to severely
diminish the availability of class actions.78 However, the effective
vindication rule balances the FAA with federal statutory rights and does
not apply to these state law contract principles.79 Therefore, Stolt-Nielsen
and Concepcion left “considerable uncertainty surrounding the precise
metes and bounds of the federal common law of arbitrability.”80 As a
result, Italian Colors provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
resolve lingering uncertainties.
E. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant: A Chance
for Clarity
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the
respondents were merchants who accepted American Express charge
cards and credit cards.81 The agreement at issue was between the
respondents, American Express, and a wholly owned subsidiary of
American Express.82 The contract contained an arbitration provision,
which foreclosed any availability of class proceedings.83 The contract
also contained a pre-dispute, binding arbitration clause.84 This arbitration
clause contained several restrictions that effectively foreclosed class
proceedings, and consequently, any realistic possibility for the
respondent to seek remedies for any alleged statutory violations.85 The
if they obtain an arbitration award greater than AT&T’s last settlement offer.”). For preferring
the agreement, see id. (“Moreover, the claim here was most unlikely to go unresolved . . . .
The district court found this scheme sufficient to provide incentive for the individual
prosecution of meritorious claims that are not immediately settled, and the Ninth Circuit
admitted that aggrieved customers who filed claims would be ‘essentially guarantee[d]’ to be
made whole. Indeed, the district court concluded that the Concepcions were better off under
their arbitration agreement with AT&T than they would have been as participants in a class
action . . . .”) (citations omitted).
78 See generally Ashby Jones, After AT&T Ruling, Should We Say Goodbye to
Consumer Class Actions?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2013, 8:49 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/27/after-att-ruling-should-we-say-goodbye-to-consumerclass-actions/.
79 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750–51 (severing the claim of unconscionability from
invocation of the effective vindication rule and explaining that the effective vindication rule
is a matter of federal law).
80 D’Antuono v. Serv. Road Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 331 (D. Conn. 2011).
81 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013).
82 Id.
83 Id. (discussing the binding arbitration provision containing a clause that “[t]here shall
be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis.”).
84 Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
85 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“That term imposes a variety of procedural bars that would
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binding arbitration and lack of cost-shifting provisions ensured that a
party could not lessen the burden of pursuing a Sherman Antitrust Act
claim because these costs greatly exceeded any possible recovery.86
This created the possibility that an entity engaging in monopolistic
behavior could encourage and strengthen such behavior by implementing
a one-sided arbitration provision in its contracts with merchants and
effectively insulating itself from the risk of any challenges.87 Congress
did not intend the FAA to permit corporations to disregard federal
antitrust laws.88
The respondents brought a class action alleging that American
Express engaged in monopolistic practices by implementing a form
contract that contained a tying arrangement in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.89 Specifically, the respondents alleged that, through its
monopoly power, American Express violated the Sherman Antitrust Act
by compelling various merchants to accept American Express credit
cards at intercharge rates approximately thirty-percent greater than the
rates for competing credit cards.90
make pursuit of the antitrust claim a fool's errand.”).
86 At the district court level, an economist provided a report that estimated the cost of the
requisite expert analysis to support the antitrust claims would be at least several hundred
thousand dollars and possibly over one million dollars but the maximum potential recovery
for an individual party would be $12,850 to $38,549 when trebled. Am. Express Co., 133 S.
Ct. at 2308. For cost-shifting provisions, see Horton, supra note 41 (“One common problem
is cost-splitting provisions, which usually require plaintiffs to pay half of the arbitral
expenses.”).
87 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (explaining that Discover Bank recognized the “perfectly rational view” that
“the terms of consumer contracts can be manipulated to insulate an agreement’s author from
liability for its own frauds by ‘deliberately cheat[ing] large numbers of consumers out of
individually small sums of money’”) (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d
1100 (Cal. 2005)). The logical result was illustrated by the Seventh Circuit explaining that
aggregate proceedings must be exceedingly “unwieldy indeed before it can be pronounced an
inferior alternative—no matter how massive the fraud or other wrongdoing that will go
unpunished if class treatment is denied—to no litigation at all” because “[t]he realistic
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only
a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30”). Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th
Cir. 2004).
88 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953) (explaining that the reports of both Houses
stressed that the purpose of the FAA is to “avoid[ ] the delay and expense of litigation”).
89 The contract contained a binding arbitration provision for all disputes and provided that
“[t]here shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis.”
Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2308.
90 Id. at 2308. The practical significance of this rate is that “[a] charge card requires its
holder to pay the full outstanding balance at the end of a billing cycle; a credit card requires
payment of only a portion, with the balance subject to interest.” Id. at n. 1.
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American Express responded by moving for enforcement of the
arbitration agreement compelling individual arbitration.91 The FAA was
the premise of American Express’ motion to compel individual
arbitration.92 However, the respondents presented evidence of an
economist’s estimate that the necessary costs associated with proving the
antitrust claims could exceed $1,000,000, while the maximum recovery
would be $12,850, or $38,549 if trebled.93
The District Court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss the
claims.94 On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the waiver was
unenforceable, opining that the merchants successfully demonstrated that
the class action waiver resulted in individual arbitration that would yield
prohibitive costs.95 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari, vacated
the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings after Stolt–Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.96 On remand, the Court of Appeals
maintained its reversal.97 The Court of Appeals then, sua sponte,
reconsidered the decision after Concepcion and reversed again after
deeming Concepcion inapplicable because preemption was a separate
issue.98 The Court of Appeals denied rehearing en banc.99 Once again,
the Supreme Court then granted certiorari.100
In its opinion, the majority stressed that arbitration is a matter of
contract.101 Pursuant to this principle, the majority explained that the

91

Id. at 2308.
Id.
93 Specifically, the economist estimated that the cost of the necessary expert report(s)
would be “at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million,” while the
maximum recovery for an individual plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549 when trebled.
Id. Treble damages are a form of multiplied-damages remedy that can facilitate antitrust
litigation. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
94 In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 2006 WL 662341, *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006).
95 In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2009).
96 Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010) (citing Stolt–Nielsen S.A.
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l. Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (holding it improper to compel a party to
submit to class arbitration when there was no agreement to do so).
97 In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 200 (2d Cir. 2011).
98 Id. at 213. It is important to note this distinction between the determinative issue of
preemption in Concepcion and the issue of effective vindication presented in Italian Colors,
where the tension was between federal statutory rights and the FAA.
99 In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012).
100 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).
101 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (“[The FAA’s]
text reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”) (citing Rent–
A–Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010).
92
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terms of arbitration agreements ought to be “rigorously enforce[d].”102
The majority further explained that antitrust laws do not “evinc[e] an
intention to preclude a waiver” of class procedures.103 The Court stated
that arbitration agreements must be strictly enforced, even in claims
regarding an alleged violation of federal statute, “unless the FAA’s
mandate has been ‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.”104
The Court opined that “antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable
procedural path to the vindication of every claim” and cited treble
damages as an example of Congress’s willingness to facilitate the
litigation of antitrust claims.105 Furthermore, the Court explained that
FRCP 23 does not guarantee a party the right to class proceedings in order
to pursue statutory rights.106 Consequently, the Court relied on this
reasoning to conclude that there was no “contrary congressional
command” to override the FAA’s mandate and invalidate the provision.107
Next, the Court turned to the effective vindication rule.108 The
majority took a narrow approach to the meaning of effective vindication
and equated it to the right or ability to merely gain access to a forum for
litigation, as opposed to the expenses of actually proving the necessary
elements of the claim.109 Specifically, the majority deemed “the fact that
it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does
not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”110
Additionally, the majority contended that the class action waiver was
analogous to the limitations on parties before the advent of class actions
102

Id. at 2309 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985)).
104 Id. (quoting CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 668–69 (2012)).
105 Id. However, by considering the sheer figures at stake, trebled damages are drastically
inadequate in this case.
106 Id. at 2309–10. The Court specifically explained that FRCP has rigorous requirements
which exclude most claims and that such a guarantee overriding private arbitration
agreements would be an “abridg[ment] or modif[ication] of a substantive right.” Id. (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012)).
107 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2309.
108 Id. at 2310 (“Respondents invoke a judge-made exception to the FAA which, they say,
serves to harmonize competing federal policies by allowing courts to invalidate agreements
that prevent the ‘effective vindication’ of a federal statutory right.”).
109 Id. at 2310–11 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)
(explaining that such a waiver would “cover a provision . . . forbidding the assertion of certain
statutory rights. And it would perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached to
arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum impracticable.”).
110 Id. at 2311.
103
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in federal proceedings in 1938.111
Lastly, the majority opined that Concepcion “all but resolve[d] th[e]
case.”112 The majority explained that, in Concepcion, the Court
“specifically rejected the argument that class arbitration was necessary to
prosecute claims ‘that might otherwise slip through the legal system.’”113
In a footnote, the majority explained that Concepcion was concerned with
the effective vindication rule.114
III. THE EFFECTIVE VINDICATION RULE NEEDS TO BE REVISITED,
CLARIFIED, AND CODIFIED
A. The Majority’s Approach to the Entirety of the Contract in the
Context of the Effective Vindication Rule
A binding arbitration agreement prohibiting aggregate party
proceedings may be valid. That is, the effective vindication rule may not
operate to invalidate a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Precedent has
never explicitly limited the rule’s applicability to the scope of class
actions alone. Rather, the effective vindication rule should be applied
with regard to “prohibitive costs” of all forms.
The contract at issue in Italian Colors not only prohibited class
actions, but also provided no other means by which any prohibitive costs
could be shifted or allocated, such that a party might have a chance of
pursuing its claims.115
Specifically, the contract contained a
confidentiality provision that prevented Italian Colors from any out-ofcourt arrangement with other similarly situated merchants to collectively
produce a common expert report.116 There is no rational reason behind
111 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23) (“[T]he individual suit that was considered adequate to
assure ‘effective vindication’ of a federal right before adoption of class-action procedures did
not suddenly become ‘ineffective vindication’ upon their adoption.”).
112 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2312 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131
S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011)).
113 Id. (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751).
114 The Court explained that Concepcion established that states cannot enforce rules
inconsistent with the FAA, even for unrelated purposes. Id. at 2319 n. 5 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752–53).
115 Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“As the Court makes clear, the contract expressly
prohibits class arbitration. But that is only part of the problem.”). The provisions of the
contract effectively ensured that no one rational party would bring suit alone. That is, because
of the lack of cost-sharing options, a party would face the Hobson’s choice of either: (1)
forgoing their statutory rights; or (2) incurring expenses far greater than any possible recovery
could yield. Specifically, the contract prohibited any joinder of claims or parties. Id.
116 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[The contract’s] confidentiality provision prevents Italian
Colors from informally arranging with other merchants to produce a common expert report.”).
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this provision, other than that it was designed primarily to keep costs high
so individual parties would face prohibitively expensive litigation.117
Furthermore, the contract did not contain any provisions that might
mitigate the need for such an economic analysis or expert report.118
Ancillary, cost-shifting, or cost-splitting provisions are not an
anomaly.119 Federal courts have already faced issues concerning costsplitting provisions. Notably, some of these circuits held that the lack of
these provisions render an agreement invalid if they operate to make
arbitration prohibitively expensive for an individual party.120 Other
circuits approached these provisions by evaluating their effect on a larger
scale to other similar parties.121 Remedial cost-shifting provisions are also
not new to arbitration clauses. Courts are not homogenous in their
approach to provisions that preclude a fee-shifting mechanism for fees
and expenses.122 The same is true for provisions that require an
unsuccessful party to reimburse the expenses of the opposing party,
though challenges to such provisions have proven less successful.123
After Randolph, courts struggled to adopt a uniform and predictable
approach to cost-shifting provisions. One approach was adopted by the
Fourth Circuit in Bradford.124 The Fourth Circuit interpreted Randolph as

117 Id. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“With the [effective vindication rule], companies
have good reason to adopt arbitral procedures that facilitate efficient and accurate handling of
complaints. Without it, companies have every incentive to draft their agreements to extract
backdoor waivers of statutory rights, making arbitration unavailable or pointless.”).
118 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
119 See Horton, supra note 41 (briefly discussing the differing approaches various circuits
have taken when evaluating these cost provisions).
120 See, e.g., Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 555–57 (4th
Cir. 2001).
121 See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 663 (6th Cir. 2003).
122 Compare Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 324 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2003) (striking down
pay-your-way provision as contrary to fee-shifting options under Title VII and the ADEA),
with Metro East Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Comm. Int’l., Inc., 294 F.3d 924,
928 (7th Cir. 2002) (allowing arbitration provision to preclude fee-shifting system under a
federal telecommunications statute).
123 See, e.g., Musnick v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that because it was not necessarily proven that the party would ultimately be
unsuccessful on the merits, this loss was deemed too speculative). However, note that the
prospect of incurring such expenses without reimbursement may have a “chilling effect” on
potential challenges. See EEOC v. Rappaport, Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal, P.C., 448 F.
Supp. 2d 458, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Morrison, 317 F.3d at 669) (analyzing whether
“the cost of arbitration may have a ‘chilling effect’ on similarly situated litigants, as opposed
to the particular effect on the plaintiff in the case”).
124 Bradford, 238 F.3d 549.
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requiring “some showing of individualized prohibitive expense . . . to
invalidate an arbitration agreement.”125 Pursuant to this interpretation, the
court implemented a fact-sensitive, analytical approach to assess the
challenging party’s financial capacity.126 This assessment was then used
to determine whether binding arbitration would effectively prevent the
party from bringing a claim.127 Other circuits have adopted this approach
but some have interpreted this threshold of hardship to be exceedingly
high.128
In contrast to the individualized approach in Bradford, some courts
have applied a more generalized framework. The Sixth Circuit rejected
the Bradford approach as only sufficient for an individual party.129 This
approach advocates looking beyond an individual party and evaluating
“whether other similarly situated individuals would be deterred . . . as
well.”130 The Sixth Circuit’s conclusion illustrates this more general
framework. Despite the fact that the challenging party was employed,
the court invalidated a cost-splitting provision providing that the
challenging party would pay over $1,000 before proceedings.131 Other
courts have greeted this framework with mixed opinions.132
However, the majority in American Express ignored these issues and
limited the scope of its analysis to include only the distinction between
aggregate and bilateral proceedings. Importantly, the scope of the
analysis should include the totality of the contract and relevant
circumstances to determine whether there are prohibitively expensive
125

Id. at 557.
Id. Examples of this could include income, net worth, debt, etc. Id.
127 Id. at 558. This approach looks to the surplus costs that arbitration would yield for
that party greater than prospective costs of litigation instead. Id.
128 See Koridze v. Fannie Mae Corp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 863, 869 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(concluding that even though challenging party had minimal financial resources and was
unemployed, plaintiff’s educational and employment background suggested that she is only
presently unable to pursue claim and could in future).
129 Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 661 (6th Cir. 2003).
130
Id.
131 Id. at 676–78.
132 The Second Circuit provides a microcosm for this issue.
See, e.g., EEOC v.
Rappaport, Hertz, Cherson & Rosenthal, P.C., 448 F. Supp. 2d 458, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(citing Morrison, 317 F.3d at 669) (analyzing whether “the cost of arbitration may have a
‘chilling effect’ on similarly situated litigants, as opposed to the particular effect on the
plaintiff in the case”); Ball v. SFX Broad., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 230, 239–40 (N.D.N.Y. 2001)
(analyzing not whether a party can afford the arbitral costs, but whether the party will likely
bear the burden of such costs). But see In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 265
F. Supp. 2d 385, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying the Bradford approach).
126
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costs that necessitate implication of the effective vindication rule—and
not simply minimize the analysis to the narrow issue of class arbitration
versus bilateral arbitration.133 Furthermore, the contract does not contain
any cost-shifting provisions that would provide for costs to be shifted,
even partially, to American Express in the event that Italian Colors’ claim
was successful.134
This all effectively ensures that, a party would not only need to
undertake such an expensive study, but that a party would also be stuck
with the bill for such a necessary study regardless of the outcome. That
is, even if Italian Colors’ claim was successful and the Court held that
American Express had indeed violated the Sherman Act, Italian Colors
would still be left holding the bill with drastically little monetary recovery
from the ruling.135 Indeed, even after a judgment for Italian Colors, the
company would likely have lost money because the litigation expenses
would outweigh the damages awarded.136
The majority in American Express did not thoroughly address the
notion that the contract not only prohibited class arbitration, but also
eliminated any possibility of “sharing, shifting, or shrinking necessary
costs.”137 Instead, the majority acknowledged the issue of cost-sharing
provisions in a footnote, explaining that the “[p]etitioners denied that, and
that is not what the Court of Appeals decision under review here held. It
held that, because other forms of cost-sharing were not economically
feasible (‘the only economically feasible means for . . . enforcing
[respondents’] statutory rights is via a class action’), the class-action
waiver was unenforceable.”138 Dissenting, Justice Elena Kagan disputed
that the class action waiver itself was all that needed to be considered.139

133 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2318–19 (2013) (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (explaining how a pre-dispute arbitration clause prohibiting class arbitration
may still be valid if there are other avenues to overcome costs).
134 Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
135 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Amex has put Italian Colors to this choice: Spend way,
way, way more money than your claim is worth, or relinquish your Sherman Act rights.”).
136 The estimated cost of the necessary expert report(s) would be “at least several hundred
thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million,” while the maximum recovery for an
individual plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549 when trebled. Id. at 2308.
137 Id. at 2308–12.
138 Id. at 2311 n.4 (quoting In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d
Cir. 2012)).
139 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Our decision [in Green
Tree] made clear that a provision raising a plaintiff’s costs could foreclose consideration of
federal claims, and so run afoul of the effective-vindication rule.”).
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Justice Kagan asserted that Randolph considered the entire scope of the
contract including cost-sharing provisions, therefore the majority’s
analysis was too narrow.140 Consequently, because the majority did not
rely on cost-sharing provisions in the decision, the implications of such
provisions remains unclear.
The key is cost effectiveness in the aggregate, and it is not simply
one aspect of the agreement that should invoke the effective vindication
rule or present an issue. Rather, it is for a court to decide whether the
totality of the circumstances which—taken together—result in pursuing
a claim “prohibitively expensive.”141 The American Express majority
applied a very narrow focus to the issue, essentially including only the
prohibition on class proceedings in the contract.142 However, the effective
vindication rule’s relationship to the FAA to ensure an equitable result
should apply to the entirety of the contract, no matter how it manages to
foreclose the possibility of pursuing meritorious federal claims.143 The
majority honed in on the class action waiver as the sole issue and made
several legitimate and persuasive points, assuming it was the only aspect
of this contract.144
The Court contended that the class action waiver only limits the
arbitration to two parties and therefore does not take away from a party’s
right to pursue its federal claims any more than federal law prior to the
adoption of the class action process.145 However, the landscape of
litigation has certainly changed since 1938, and class actions are now

140 Id. (“The expense at issue in Randolph came from a filing fee combined with a perdiem payment for the arbitrator. But nothing about those particular costs is distinctive; and
indeed, a rule confined to them would be weirdly idiosyncratic.”).
141 For a sampling of possible cost-sharing mechanisms, see id. at 2318–19 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
142 See id. at 2319 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining how the majority took a narrow
approach and did not consider how the entire contract operates).
143 Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[The majority] concocts a special exemption for
class-arbitration waivers—ignoring that this case concerns much more than that. Throughout,
the majority disregards our decisions’ central tenet: An arbitration clause may not thwart
federal law, irrespective of exactly how it does so.”).
144 Id. at 2318–19 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing how the majority limits their
analysis to the waiver instead of evaluating the entire effect of the contract).
145 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2311 (“The class-action waiver merely limits arbitration
to the two contracting parties. It no more eliminates those parties’ right to pursue their
statutory remedy than did federal law before its adoption of the class action for legal relief in
1938. Or, to put it differently, the individual suit that was considered adequate to assure
‘effective vindication’ of a federal right before adoption of class-action procedures did not
suddenly become ‘ineffective vindication’ upon their adoption.”).
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more commonplace. Therefore, the meaning of “effective vindication”
should not apply so narrowly, such that it only addresses what was
considered “effective” at the time of the FAA’s enactment. The benefit
of certainty derived from a rigid rule allowing such an approach may not
outweigh the harm done to those parties without any prudent means
necessary to pursue their claims. A court’s analysis should consider the
totality of the circumstances and should not be limited to what may have
been “effective” decades ago.146 The majority gave this issue little
consideration through a footnote.147
B. The Majority’s Approach to Ancillary Provisions in the
Contract
The majority largely ignored ancillary provisions that prevented any
form of cost-shifting whatsoever.148 Consequently, the validity of these
ancillary provisions remains unclear for future cases. The majority
quickly brushed away this discussion in a footnote reasoning that the
opinion from the decision on appeal before the Court had held that,
because the other forms of cost-sharing were not economically feasible,
“the only economically feasible means for . . . enforcing [respondents’]
statutory rights is via a class action . . . .”149 However, the Court would
have been wise to simply address the ancillary provisions in dicta, at the
least, to provide future guidance instead of summarily ignoring them.
As explained by Justice Kagan, the majority in Italian Colors failed
to address any of the ancillary provisions of the agreement, which
effectively prohibited the respondents from pursuing a claim.150 Because
the majority did not address these ancillary provisions, there is no process
or standard in place by which lower courts can evaluate them. Rather,
lower courts are left with a rigid and narrow application of the FAA and
146 Id. at 2319 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he effective-vindication rule asks about the
world today, not the world as it might have looked when Congress passed a given statute.”).
147 See id. at 2311 n. 4 (“Who can disagree with the dissent’s assertion that ‘the effectivevindication rule asks about the world today, not the world as it might have looked when
Congress passed a given statute’? But time does not change the meaning of effectiveness,
making ineffective vindication today what was effective vindication in the past.”) (citation
omitted).
148 Id. at 2319 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining that “[i]t is only in this Court that the
case has become strangely narrow, as the majority stares at a single provision rather than
considering, in the way the effective-vindication rule demands, how the entire contract
operates”).
149 Id. at 2311 n. 4.
150 See id. at 2316–20 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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the effective vindication rule.
Faced with another case, the Supreme Court can properly address
the ancillary provisions. The Italian Colors opinion took a large bite out
of the effective vindication rule as it allows a loophole for these entities
to implement clever ancillary provisions, which work in concert to
foreclose any possibility of a claim being brought because of exorbitant
costs or unusual proceedings, such as a very brief statute of limitations to
bring the claim.151 Therefore, the Supreme Court should address this
issue.
C. The Majority’s Application of Concepcion
The majority also claims that Concepcion “all but resolves the
case.”152 However, there are several issues with this conclusion. First,
the effective vindication rule applies to the FAA in relation to other
federal statutory rights, whereas Concepcion concerned preemption
between the FAA and a conflicting state law.153 Second, the pre-dispute
arbitration agreement in Concepcion allowed for more cost-shifting than
did the contract at issue in Italian Colors and therefore differs in kind.154
Third, Concepcion concluded that the FAA preempted a state rule
requiring the availability of class procedures before arbitration would be
enforced.155 However, the issue is not as narrow as simply the availability
151 See Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“If the rule were
limited to baldly exculpatory provisions, however, a monopolist could devise numerous ways
around it . . . . On the front end: The agreement might set outlandish filing fees or establish
an absurd (e.g., one-day) statute of limitations, thus preventing a claimant from gaining access
to the arbitral forum. On the back end: The agreement might remove the arbitrator's authority
to grant meaningful relief, so that a judgment gets the claimant nothing worthwhile. And in
the middle: The agreement might block the claimant from presenting the kind of proof that is
necessary to establish the defendant's liability—say, by prohibiting any economic testimony
. . . . Or else the agreement might appoint as an arbitrator an obviously biased person . . . .
The possibilities are endless—all less direct than an express exculpatory clause, but no less
fatal. So the rule against prospective waivers of federal rights can work only if it applies not
just to a contract clause explicitly barring a claim, but to others that operate to do so.”).
152 Id. at 2312 (“Truth to tell, our decision in [Concepcion] all but resolves this case.”).
153 The majority concluded that the “[b]ecause it ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,’ California's
Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
154 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Concepcion, 131
S. Ct. at 1753) (explaining that the claim in Concepcion was “‘most unlikely to go unresolved’
because AT&T’s agreement contained a host of features ensuring that ‘aggrieved customers
who filed claims would be essentially guaranteed to be made whole.’”).
155 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1755 (abrogating Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113
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of class procedure, but rather, is whether the party has any means of
effectively vindicating a meritorious federal claim under the totality of
the contract.156
Concepcion boiled down to a simple issue of federal law preempting
conflicting state law.157 Nowhere in the opinion did the Court cite any
precedent concerning the effective vindication rule; yet the majority in
Italian Colors swiftly disposed of the issue by claiming that Concepcion
“all but resolves” the case.158 However, the preemption doctrine is an
entirely distinct concern removed from the realm of the effective
vindication rule. The Second Circuit properly recognized this important
distinction on remand when the Court deemed Concepcion inapplicable
because it addressed a matter of preemption.159 Where preemption
concerns federal law trumping conflicting state law, the effective
vindication rule applies to the friction created when the FAA threatens to
lessen the enforcement of federal statutory rights.160
P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)).
156 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The effective-vindication
rule asks whether an arbitration agreement as a whole precludes a claimant from enforcing
federal statutory rights. No single provision is properly viewed in isolation, because an
agreement can close off one avenue to pursue a claim while leaving others open. In this case,
for example, the agreement could have prohibited class arbitration without offending the
effective-vindication rule if it had provided an alternative mechanism to share, shift, or reduce
the necessary costs. The agreement's problem is that it bars not just class actions, but also all
mechanisms—many existing long before the Sherman Act, if that matters—for joinder or
consolidation of claims, informal coordination among individual claimants, or amelioration
of arbitral expenses.”) (emphasis in original).
157 Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“When a state rule allegedly conflicts with the
FAA, we apply standard preemption principles, asking whether the state law frustrates the
FAA’s purposes and objectives. If the state rule does so—as the Court found in
[Concepcion]—the Supremacy Clause requires its invalidation. We have no earthly interest
(quite the contrary) in vindicating that law. Our effective-vindication rule comes into play
only when the FAA is alleged to conflict with another federal law, like the Sherman Act
here.”). The preemption doctrine stems from the Supremacy Clause, which establishes federal
law the “Supreme Law of the Land.” See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Gade v. Nat’l Solid
Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (explaining that the “preemption doctrine is
derived” from the Supremacy Clause).
158 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2319–20 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[Concepcion] was
not—and could not have been—about the effective-vindication rule. Here is a tip-off:
[Concepcion] nowhere cited our effective-vindication precedents.”).
159 Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Construction and Application of Federal
Arbitration Act—Supreme Court Cases, 28 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (originally published in 2008)
(“The Second Circuit panel found [Concepcion] inapplicable because it addressed
preemption.”).
160 Preemption issues are applied categorically to three situations. Express preemption
occurs where the text of the statute facially expresses the intent to preempt state law. English
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The premise that the FAA preempts conflicting state law was
established well before Concepcion in Southland Corp. v. Keating.161
Relying on the legislative history behind the FAA, the Supreme Court
majority held that “[i]n creating a substantive rule applicable in state as
well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative
attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”162
Furthermore, as in Concepcion, the effective vindication rule was
inapplicable. There, the tension between the majority and dissent was
regarding basic federalism concerns.163 Dissenting, Justice John Paul
Stevens relied on the Savings Clause of Section 2 of the FAA, which
provides that arbitration contracts are revocable upon “such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”164 Justice
Stevens argued that there is a presumption against preemption in areas
traditionally dominated by the states (in this case, contract law).165
However, the majority rejected this argument and concluded that the
FAA preempted California’s anti-waiver rule in the realm of arbitration
contracts.166 Notably, Justice Scalia resurrected this issue in Italian
Colors even though the dispute did not concern preemption in the
slightest.167
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990). Implied field preemption occurs where there
is either pervasive federal regulation or a dominant federal interest in a field such that state
law is preempted. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Implied conflict
preemption occurs where state law makes it impossible for someone to comply with both
federal law and state law or where state law effectively serves as an obstacle to the purpose
of the federal legislation. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142–43 (1963) (discussing impossibility preemption); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941) (discussing obstacle preemption).
161 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
162 Id. at 16.
163 Compare AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011)
(explaining that “California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA”), with
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“But federalism is as much a question
of deeds as words. It often takes the form of a concrete decision by this Court that respects
the legitimacy of a State's action in an individual case. Here, recognition of that federalist
ideal, embodied in specific language in this particular statute, should lead us to uphold
California's law, not to strike it down. We do not honor federalist principles in their breach.”).
164 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)).
165 Id. at 18–19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 16 n.10 (“[H]olding that the Arbitration Act preempts a state law that withdraws
the power to enforce arbitration agreements . . . .”).
167 “Justice Scalia said the FAA reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a
matter of contract, and he cited the Court’s decision in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,
132 S. Ct. 665, 181 L. Ed. 2d 586 (2012), as recognizing that this principle holds true for
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It is important to note that the state law at issue in Concepcion
prohibited class-action waivers even if a party could effectively vindicate
its claim in individual arbitration.168 Therefore, the waiver at issue in
Concepcion had no occasion to be addressed via the effective vindication
rule as it concerned the preemption of a state law.169 The Court clarified
that the waiver’s ancillary provisions made it practically certain that a
party would be able to vindicate its rights.170 Thus, the majority
incorrectly applied precedent that is not concerned with the effective
vindication rule and should have properly applied the effective
vindication precedent to address the tension between the FAA and federal
statutory claims where the party may not be otherwise able to effectively
vindicate its rights.171
The class action waiver at issue in Concepcion differed greatly from
that in Italian Colors because of the ancillary provisions contained in
each case. In Italian Colors, the ancillary provisions at issue completely
foreclosed any possibility of cost-shifting, cost-sharing, or costrecovery.172 However, the waiver at issue in Concepcion provided for
significant cost-sharing—so much so, that the Court even explained the
complaint was “most unlikely to go unresolved” because of the
provisions providing that “aggrieved customers who filed claims would
be essentially guaranteed to be made whole.”173 Therefore, the Court
claims that allege a violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA’s mandate has been
overridden by a contrary congressional command.” Rosenhouse, supra note 159.
168 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745) (“[T]he state law in question made classaction waivers unenforceable even when a party could feasibly vindicate her claim in an
individual arbitration. The state rule was designed to preserve the broad-scale ‘deterrent
effects of class actions,’ not merely to protect a particular plaintiff's right to assert her own
claim.”).
169 Id. at 2319–20 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[Concepcion] was not—and could not have
been—about the effective-vindication rule. Here is a tip-off: [Concepcion] nowhere cited our
effective-vindication precedents . . . . [Concepcion] involved a state law, and therefore could
not possibly implicate the effective-vindication rule. When a state rule allegedly conflicts
with the FAA, we apply standard preemption principles, asking whether the state law
frustrates the FAA’s purposes and objectives.”).
170 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
171 Am. Express Co.,, 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining that
Concepcion does not apply and “[t]he relevant decisions are instead Mitsubishi and
Randolph”).
172 Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the waiver also not only prohibits
class arbitration, but also eliminates any possibility of “sharing, shifting, or shrinking
necessary costs”).
173 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (“Moreover, the claim here was most unlikely to go
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expressly provided that the waiver posed no risk to the effective
vindication of an aggrieved party’s statutory rights and therefore could in
no way apply to the issue in Italian Colors, or “a party’s ability to
vindicate a meritorious claim.”174 Surprisingly, Justice Scalia authored
both opinions, and although emphasizing the cost-shifting provisions in
Concepcion, Justice Scalia entirely ignored them in Italian Colors despite
claiming that Concepcion resolved the issues.175
The Italian Colors majority relied on the holding in Concepcion by
stating that the Court “specifically rejected the argument that class
arbitration was necessary” to resolve the issue.176 Nowhere does Italian
Colors argue solely that the prohibition on class proceedings alone
deprives them of the ability to effectively vindicate their claim. However,
the majority framed the issue in such a narrow manner that made this the
only plausible way to apply Concepcion to this case at all.177
D. The Majority’s Interpretation of the Ability to Effectively
Vindicate Federal Statutory Rights
The Italian Colors majority attempted to distinguish the costs at
issue from those in Randolph.178 In Randolph, the expenses were to be
incurred at the onset of the claim.179 In contrast, the issue in Italian Colors
was that the plaintiffs’ total cost of pursuing their claims would outweigh
the potential recovery.180 There is no practical difference between the
unresolved . . . . The Ninth Circuit admitted that aggrieved customers who filed claims would
be ‘essentially guarantee[d]’ to be made whole. Indeed, the district court concluded that the
Concepcions were better off under their arbitration agreement with AT&T than they would
have been as participants in a class action . . . .”) (internal citations omitted).
174 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“So the Court professed
that [Concepcion] did not implicate the only thing . . . this case involves.”).
175 Compare Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (explaining that the cost-shifting provisions
practically ensured an aggrieved party’s ability to vindicate their rights), with Am. Express
Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2308–12 (discussing the merits of the argument to the exclusion of the lack
of cost-shifting provisions in the arbitration agreement).
176 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2312.
177 Id. (“The idea that [Concepcion] controls here depends entirely on the majority’s view
that this case is ‘class action or bust.’ Were the majority to drop that pretense, it could make
no claim for [Concepcion]’s relevance.”).
178 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
179 See Green Tree Fin. Corp, 531 U.S. at 84 (explaining that the claimant faced
potentially steep filing fees and arbitrators’ costs).
180 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The expense at issue in
Green Tree Financial Corp came from a filing fee combined with a per-diem payment for the
arbitrator.”). The prospective expenses in Italian Colors largely consisted of the cost to
produce an expert report. Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]hat expert report would cost
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costs in Randolph and the costs in Italian Colors because the costs must
necessarily exceed the maximum potential recovery, and there was no
adequate cost-recovery or cost-shifting possible. In fact, the costs
incurred by Italian Colors would likely outweigh the maximum potential
recovery by ten to one in a best-case scenario.181 To make such fine
distinctions between the filing fees in Randolph and necessary expert
reports in Italian Colors is irrational because there is no practical
difference in their effect on deterring claims.182 Therefore, there is no
reason to treat them differently, as they both present the same issue and
make pursuing a claim prohibitively expensive.183 That is, both forms of
expenses must necessarily be incurred in order to bring the challenge in
the first place.184
Furthermore, the Italian Colors majority asserted that Mitsubishi did
not apply because Italian Colors was not explicitly prohibited from
asserting the right and that Randolph did not apply because Italian Colors
was not forced to incur filing and administrative fees, that effectively
made “access to the forum impracticable.”185 The majority distinguished
the Italian Colors issue as being one of “proving a statutory remedy.”186
However, no precedent expressly limits the scope of the effective
vindication rule solely to “baldly exculpatory clauses” and “prohibitive
fees” as the majority contends.187 By imposing this restriction on the
rule’s scope, the majority allowed entities to impose other more creative
provisions that would effectively both insulate the entity from liability
and place the provision outside of the baldly exculpatory clauses or

between several hundred thousand and one million dollars.”).
181 Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“So the expense involved in proving the claim in
arbitration is ten times what Italian Colors could hope to gain, even in a best-case scenario.
That counts as a “prohibitive” cost, in Green Tree Financial Corp.’s terminology, if anything
does. No rational actor would bring a claim worth tens of thousands of dollars if doing so
meant incurring costs in the hundreds of thousands.”).
182 Id. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The expense at issue in Randolph came from a
filing fee combined with a per-diem payment for the arbitrator. But nothing about those
particular costs is distinctive; and indeed, a rule confined to them would be weirdly
idiosyncratic.”).
183 Id.
184 Put simply: without paying the filing fees, there would be no access to the arbitral
forum in Randolph and without paying for the expert reports, there would be no basis for the
claim at all in Italian Colors. In either case, the costs operate as a prerequisite to the challenge.
185 See Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11.
186 Id. at 2311.
187 Id. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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prohibitive fees the majority limited the scope to.188
E. Revisiting, Clarifying, and Codifying the Effective Vindication
Rule to Provide Guidance, Reel in Business Entities, and Bring
Predictability to Courts’ Opinions
In Italian Colors, the majority framed the issue as “whether a
contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under the Federal
Arbitration Act when the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a
federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery.”189 This approach
is far too narrow. The effective vindication rule should be interpreted
more flexibly to account for the totality of the contract and relevant
surrounding circumstances at issue, as large-scale, pre-dispute arbitration
contracts become more prevalent, creative, and controversial. Such a
narrow and rigid approach is far too inadequate for the purposes of
addressing future developments.
The standard for invoking the effective vindication rule should be
clarified to apply whenever the FAA threatens to foreclose other federal
statutory rights. In making this determination, courts should consider any
and all provisions that function, individually or in combination, to prevent
a party from effectively vindicating a party’s statutory rights. To prevent
should include, but not be limited to: baldly exculpatory clauses,
prohibitive fees, and a lack of cost-shifting or cost-recovery provisions,
which function to make pursuit of the claim reasonably certain to be
either financially imprudent or expressly barred.
It is evident from the disparity between the majority and dissent in
Italian Colors as well as the opinions throughout the procedural history
of Italian Colors, that case law interpreting the effective vindication rule
does not provide clear guidance.190 Chapter One of the FAA contains
sixteen sections.191 Section 2 addresses the “[v]alidity, irrevocability, and

188 See id. at 2317–18. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (providing examples of provisions which
fall outside the scope of the decision but may still insulate the party from liability). See also
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d at 1110 (Cal. 2005) (“[I]n a consumer contract of
adhesion [when] . . . disputes . . . involve small amounts of damages . . . the waiver [of a class
action] becomes in practice the exemption of the party from responsibility for [its] own
fraud.”) (internal quotations omitted).
189 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2307.
190 Compare, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010), with In re
Am. Exp. Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom., Am. Exp. Co., 133 S.
Ct. at 2304.
191 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
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enforcement of agreements to arbitrate” and therefore the effective
vindication rule fits this section.192 However, there is a danger that this
section already provides for common law state contract defenses that
have previously been mistakenly entangled with the effective vindication
rule.193 Thus, the text of the amendment must make clear that the effective
vindication rule is a separate theory. Specifically, the text must make
clear that this Section applies only when the FAA threatens to foreclose
other federal statutory rights. This distinction can ensure that federalism
issues are avoided.194
IV. CONCLUSION
The effective vindication rule was developed as a tool for preserving
federal statutory rights in the face of the FAA, but the rule has not been
applied consistently.195 As Italian Colors shows, there is considerable
disagreement concerning the role of the effective vindication rule and
how it should be applied to balance the relationship between the FAA and
threatened federal statutory rights.196 Consequently, the effective
vindication rule must be revisited and clarified to provide for a more
explicit standard or process to include an analysis of the totality of the
contract. Furthermore, Chapter One of the FAA should be amended to
codify the effective vindication rule. Because Section 2 of the FAA
concerns “[v]alidity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate,” the effective vindication rule should be provided under this
section.197 The rule could be codified as follows:

192

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (“[A contract] shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”). See supra Part
II.A (discussing unconscionability defense’s early relationship with the effective vindication
rule). See also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–51 (2011)
(severing the claim of unconscionability from invocation of the effective vindication rule and
explaining that the effective vindication rule is a matter of federal law).
194 Specifically, this is to eliminate any tension between state law issues and the FAA.
For further discussion on federalism, see Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism’s Options, 14
YALE J. ON REG. 465 (1996).
195 For an overview of the development of the effective vindication rule and its
application, see supra Part II.
196 Compare supra Part II (explaining the development of the effective vindication rule),
with supra Part III (discussing both the majority’s and dissent’s application of the effective
vindication to federal statutory rights).
197 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
193
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A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out
of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable except:
(A) Upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract; or
(B) If the contract operates to effectively foreclose the availability of
a party’s ability to prudently and effectively pursue the
vindication of federal statutory rights, such a provision may be
invalidated where necessary to preserve the effect of federal
statutory rights and invalidate contracts which frustrate public
policy. The party challenging the contract must bear the burden
of presenting evidence that is beyond mere speculation.198

Only through an express statement of this standard will contracting
parties be able to conduct business with confidence regarding how courts
will evaluate any arbitration clauses. By having a clear standard in place,
courts will also be able to address these disputes with greater consistency.
Until then, the effective vindication rule’s role remains unresolved and in
a state of flux that unnecessarily increases transaction costs to
commercial entities and poses a substantial risk that future meritorious
claims will be forgone.

198

The language in Section A is presently codified. The language concerning the ability
to effectively pursue statutory remedies is borrowed from Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985) (“[I]n the event . . . clauses operated
in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust
violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public
policy.”) (citing Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955); Redel’s Inc.
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 98–99 (5th Cir. 1974); Gaines v. Carrollton Tobacco Bd. of
Trade, Inc., 386 F.2d 757, 759 (6th Cir. 1967); Fox Midwest Theatres v. Means, 221 F.2d
173, 180 (8th Cir. 1955); 15 S. WILLISTON Contracts § 1750A (3d ed. 1972)). Also, note that
the language refers only to the tension between the FAA and federal statutory rights to
distinguish the issue of preemption from Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (California’s rule
from Discover Bank was preempted by FAA). The addition of the challenging party bearing
the burden of showing that the threat to the ability to pursue causes of action must be more
than mere speculation is derived from Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79,
90 (2000) (“The ‘risk’ that Randolph will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative
to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.”).
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